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Drawing on a corpus of ten oral interviews with survivors and perpetrators of the 1994 
Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, we examine how the government’s policy of unity 
and reconciliation has shaped post-genocide identities and intergroup relations in local 
Rwandan communities. By focusing on the relationships between individuals and the 
national post-genocide narrative, we show how the socio-political context in Rwanda 
influences how people locate themselves and how they ascribe rights and duties to and in 
relation to others. Specifically, we use positioning theory as an interpretive lens to argue 
that individuals view adherence to the government’s post-genocide narrative of unity and 
reconciliation as a moral duty, which is vital to continued political stability and economic 
development in Rwanda. Our discussion focuses on explaining how the social positioning 
of the national post-genocide narrative may function to reinforce the ethnic tensions the 
government has pledged to eradicate. 
 
 
Key words: Rwanda, Genocide against the Tutsi, unity and reconciliation, positioning 
theory, ndi umunyarwanda 
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The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda was one of the most intimate genocides 
of the twentieth century. Not only were an extraordinary number of people killed in a 
very short period of time, often in the most brutal ways imaginable, but also the Rwandan 
government at the time of the genocide was able to incite mass involvement of civilians 
in the killings.1 In a period of just three months, between April and July 1994, as many as 
one million people were murdered, often by loved ones, relatives, neighbors or friends. 
The majority of the victims were Tutsi, but some Hutu were also killed. Following 
military victory in July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front was faced with the seemingly 
impossible challenge of restoring peace, stability, and unity to a highly divided and 
traumatized country. The healing process for a collective trauma such as genocide is 
understandably long and complicated: survivors need to come to terms with their trauma 
and manage the physical, social, and emotional pain they have experienced; governments 
are challenged with creating constructive ideologies and rebuilding harmonious 
intergroup relations.2 The scale of the genocide in Rwanda has meant that survivors and 
perpetrators now find themselves having to live side by side, with survivors sometimes 
dependent on perpetrators and their relatives for support, particularly in rural areas.3 
Reconciliation is broadly defined as the restoration of trust and positive relations 
between formerly adversarial groups4 and is therefore a dynamic process that requires 
change to occur at both individual and societal levels. In 1999, the Rwandan government 
founded the National Commission for Unity and Reconciliation (NURC), which has 
implemented several programs aimed at changing the emotions, attitudes, and behaviors 
of all its citizens. The stated role of the NURC is “to foster unity and reconciliation 
among the people of Rwanda who had experienced long periods of bad governance 
characterized by divisions, discriminations, human rights abuse and acts of violence.”5 At 
the core of NURC policies is the promotion of a unified national identity: Ndi 
Umunyarwanda, which means, “I am Rwandan” (not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa). One of the 
aims of the Ndi Umunyarwanda program is to help the Rwandan people, particularly 
youth, to better understand their origins. As such, it supports the RPF government’s 
narrative of the Genocide against the Tutsi, which looks back to pre-colonial Rwanda 
when, it is claimed, social divisions were based on economic status rather than any notion 
of ethnic difference. Ethnic differences, according to the officially sanctioned narrative, 
were invented and reinforced by colonial authorities.6  
In this article, we discuss a corpus of ten interviews with both survivors and 
perpetrators of the 1994 genocide to examine how Rwandan citizens are positioned in 
relation to the government’s narrative of unity and reconciliation. Our analysis draws on 																																																								
1 Alette Smeulers and Lotte Hoex, “Studying the Microdynamics of the Rwandan Genocide,” British 
Journal of Criminology 50, no. 3 (2010), 435. 
2 Ervin Staub, “Building a Peaceful Society: Origins, Prevention, and Reconciliation after Genocide and 
Other Group Violence,” American Psychologist 68, no. 7 (2013), 576. 
3 Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence 
in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Africa 76, no. 2 (2006), 131. 
4 Herbert C. Kelman, “Reconciliation From a Social-Psychological Perspective,” in The Social Psychology 
of Intergroup Reconciliation, ed. Arie Nadler et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15. 
5 The Rwandan Government: National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, About Us, accessed January 
10, 2017, http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=73.	
6 Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Nation, Narration, Unification? The Politics of History Teaching after the 
Rwandan Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 1 (2009), 31. Nigel Eltringham, Accounting for 
Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda, (London: Pluto Press, 2004). 
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positioning theory,7 which provides a methodology for analyzing qualitative data. In 
positioning theory, everyday social interactions can be understood as unfolding episodes 
of an overarching storyline. Of particular relevance to our analysis is the claim that the 
positioning of a category of persons can be deliberately enacted through decisions and 
policies made by government institutions. This theory can help us understand how the 
Rwandan government’s policy on national unity and reconciliation has served to shape 
individuals’ post-genocide identities and social interactions. As we will argue in this 
paper, the Rwandan government’s policy on unity and reconciliation positions citizens 
with a moral duty to uphold the tenets of this policy for the good of their country. 
Focusing on the relationships between individuals and the Rwandan national narrative, 
we show that the socio-political context in Rwanda influences how people locate 
themselves and how they ascribe rights and duties in relation to others. By analyzing the 
interviews within the context of the Ndi Umunyarwanda program, we reflect on the 
political and social implications of the national storyline of unity and reconciliation for 
different social groups in Rwanda. These implications range from intergroup harmony 
between survivors and perpetrators to more harmful consequences, such as ostracization, 
for people who refuse to conform to the national storyline. 
 
 
Social Positioning  
 
Positioning theory focuses on decoding the implicit and explicit meanings of people’s 
actions towards one another by attending to the features of the local context that, in a 
particular moment, are being either conformed to or resisted.8 These features include the 
rules, social norms and conventions of appropriate conduct in a given context. According 
to positioning theory there is a clear distinction between what it is logically possible for a 
person to say or do in a particular context and what is socially permissible in that same 
context. In the Rwandan context, it is logically possible to speak out against the 
government and it might be socially permissible to do so among a trusted group of 
friends, but it would not be permissible to disagree with the government in a public 
forum, as you would risk being arrested. Furthermore, a central principle of positioning 
theory is that the constraints of a context or social role mean that not all individuals 
participating in a social interaction will have equal access to the full repertoire of possible 
actions in that moment.9 To return to and elaborate on our previous example, while it 
might be logically possible for a citizen to disagree with the government in a public 
setting, in so far as they could exercise their free will to express their opinion, the severity 
of the action that might be taken by the government in response to such an action 
effectively operates to deny the right to speak out to the individual in that context. The 																																																								
7 Rom Harré and Fathali M. Moghaddam, “Introduction: The Self and Others in Traditional Psychology 
and in Positioning Theory,” in The Self and Others: Positioning Individuals and Groups in Personal, 
Political, and Cultural Contexts, ed. Rom Harré and Fathali M. Moghaddam (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger Publishers, 2003), 1–11. 
8 Rom Harré et al., “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” Theory & Psychology 19, no. 1 (2009), 5–
31. 
9 Rom Harré, “Positioning Theory: Moral Dimensions of Social-Cultural Psychology,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Culture and Psychology, ed. Jaan Valsiner (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 191–
206.	
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position held by an individual determines the extent of the rights, duties and cultural 
resources (i.e., the identity) that she or he is permitted to express in a particular context at 
a particular moment in time. Thus, an ordinary Rwandan citizen is denied the agency and 
power to disagree with the government in public and therefore is afforded only the 
identity of an obedient and law-abiding citizen in this context. 
Given the varied nature of human interaction, different types of positioning can 
occur in particular situations.10 Of particular relevance to this article is the deliberate 
positioning that occurs when the duties and rights of a category of persons are positioned 
through decisions and policies implemented by government institutions.11 This form of 
positioning pushes an individual to engage in forced moral positioning, where their 
utterances make reference to rights and duties they feel obliged to enact given their 
designated role in society.12 In this article, we interpret the Rwandan government’s policy 
of national unity and reconciliation as a storyline that functions to set the cultural stage 
for the ways in which survivors and perpetrators are positioned to act towards one 
another. We use this cultural context as an interpretative framework with which to 
understand how the Rwandan government’s policy on national unity and reconciliation 
has served to shape individuals’ post-genocide identities and social interactions. As we 
will demonstrate in this article, the government’s policy on unity and reconciliation 
positions citizens with a moral duty to uphold the tenets of this policy for the good of the 
country.13  
 
The Corpus of Interviews 
 
Our analysis is based on ten oral interviews with individuals who self-identified as either 
survivors or perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. All the interviewees had 
since joined grass-roots associations that aim to promote unity and reconciliation in their 
home communities. These cooperative associations mobilize survivors and perpetrators to 
work together voluntarily on projects that benefit the community such as building houses 
for orphans of the genocide. The interviews were obtained from the Genocide Archive of 
Rwanda, which went online in 2010 and contains a wealth of original documents, 
testimonies, recordings and materials relating to the genocide. It is managed by UK-based 
NGO, the Aegis Trust. Participation in the interviews was voluntary; interviewees did not 
receive payment for their participation. The Genocide Archive Rwanda identified ten 
associations and contacted the president of each association to ask if they and their 
members would be willing to be interviewed. The president of each association then 
invited some of his/her members to be interviewed. Given that the authors of the present 
article were not involved in data collection for this project, we do not know how the 
presidents of participating associations selected members to be interviewed, nor whether 																																																								
10 Rom Harré and Luk Van Langenhove, “Varieties of Positioning,” Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour 21, no. 4 (1991), 393–407. 
11  Harré and Moghaddam, “Introduction: The Self and Others in Traditional Psychology and in Positioning 
Theory.” 
12 Gregor Zelle, “Exploring the Application of Positioning Theory to the Analysis of Organisational 
Change.” (paper, Australian and New Zeland Academy of Management Conference, Adelaide, Austrailia, 
2009). 
13 Susan Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power: Everyday Resistance to Reconciliation in Postgenocide 
Rwanda, (Maidson, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013).	
	 6 
members felt socially obligated to participate. However, it is possible that members might 
share only a positive view of their current situation and relationships with others if they 
felt pressured to participate at the request of their president. We further discuss the 
limitations of our data when presenting our findings and conclusions.  
These ten interviews are the full corpus of interviews available from the Genocide 
Archive Rwanda on this topic to date, and all the interviews were conducted in group 
settings with members of unity and reconciliation associations at their usual meeting 
place. The interviews ranged in length, with the shortest lasting 45 minutes and the 
longest lasting around 90 minutes. Across the ten interviews, there are 19 men and 16 
women with 20 interviewees identifying as survivors, 10 identifying as perpetrators, 4 as 
family members of perpetrators, and 1 person who spoke too briefly to be categorized. 
Staff members from the Archive, themselves genocide survivors, conducted these ten 
interviews in 2014 to mark the twentieth commemoration of the 1994 genocide, Kwibuka 
20, the theme of which was “Remember, Unite, Renew.” The fact that the interviews 
were conducted by survivors during the commemoration period may have influenced 
interviewees’ responses by encouraging survivors and perpetrators to censor their true 
feelings and adopt a more favorable view on reconciliation than they otherwise might 
have had. However, all those interviewed had all already signed up to unity and 
reconciliation associations suggesting that they already subscribed to the Rwandan 
government’s narrative. Given this context, it is unsurprising that we found very little 
variation in response.  
The interviews were conducted and recorded in the individuals’ native language, 
Kinyarwanda. With the permission of the Genocide Archive of Rwanda, we 
commissioned the translation of these interviews into English. We used a rigorous 
translation process: first, the audio files were transcribed verbatim into written 
Kinyarwanda. Second, a staff member from the Genocide Archive of Rwanda checked 
the quality of the transcribed documents. Third, we employed two local translators who 
each translated the interviews into English. Finally, the accuracy of the translations was 
ensured through the employment of a further translator who back-translated the 
interviews from English into Kinyarwanda. Any discrepancies between the translations 
and Kinyarwanda transcripts were discussed with both authors, and changes only made 
when it was agreed that the translation had altered the meaning of the original source text. 
All the interviewees had signed formal consent forms prior to the interview, in which 
they agreed for their interview to be stored online by the Genocide Archive of Rwanda 
and accessed by third parties such as educators and researchers. Despite the participants’ 
informed consent and in the interest of protecting their confidentiality, we have removed 
personal information from the extracts of the interviews presented in this article. We have 
numbered the interviews from one to ten and we identify the extracts by these numbers. 
Readers can therefore identify which extracts are taken from the same association, but the 
anonymity of the interviewees is protected. 
The staff at the archive used a semi-structured interview, in which they asked all 
individuals to describe how their community association had started, why they had 
chosen to join the association and what they thought were the benefits of being a member 
of such an association. Thus, although the interviews were conducted in groups, the 
interviewer was focused on collecting the personal viewpoints and experiences of each 
member, rather than interviewing members in the capacity as official representatives of 
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their respective associations. The semi-structured interview enabled staff to collect 
responses to the areas of interest (outlined above), but it also gave the staff freedom to 
ask their own questions or follow up questions if something an interviewee said was 
interesting and relevant to the topic of unity and reconciliation. Although the interviews 
were focused on showcasing successful stories of post-genocide reconciliation, the 
interviewers did ask people to be candid when sharing their reasons for joining the 
association and whether they had had any reservations about doing so. Given the context 
and purpose of these interviews, we acknowledge that they do not represent the full range 
of possible attitudes to the Rwandan government’s policies on unity and reconciliation, 
and our conclusions should be considered in light of this fact. They do, however, offer 
some useful insight into how individual Rwandans endorse the government’s policy. 
Before turning to the narratives that emerge from the individual interviews, we will first 
outline the Rwandan government’s storyline of unity and reconciliation against and 
within which these individual stories are positioned. 
 
Unity and Reconciliation  
 
In a stated attempt to avoid repeating history, the Rwandan government has tasked the 
NURC with the implementation of policies and programs designed to educate, sensitize 
and mobilize citizens to work towards unity and reconciliation in Rwanda after the 1994 
genocide. All the programs implemented by the commission work towards one broader 
goal: to foster social cohesion through the removal of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa ethnic labels 
in favor of identification with a national Rwandan identity. For example, the aims of the 
Ingando program were to re-educate a diverse range of groups on the role of former 
colonial powers in creating distinct Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities, and to stress the 
importance of good governance in moving forward and rebuilding Rwanda.14 According 
to the Rwandan government, Hutu and Tutsi civilians lived together in peace and unity 
before the genocide, such that external forces, including both the German then Belgian 
colonial powers and the former leaders of the Hutu genocidal regime are seen as solely 
responsible for the divisionism that fueled the genocide. However, critics of the 
government’s policy have pointed to the tension between a forward-looking narrative 
calling for the elimination of ethnicity and a retrospective narrative of the history of the 
genocide,15 which runs the risk of associating all Hutu with the perpetration of genocide 
and all Tutsi with victimhood.16  
Fourteen years after the creation of the NURC, on June 30, 2013, during a Youth 
Connect conference in the Rwandan capital of Kigali, president Paul Kagame invited all 
Hutu, especially young people, to apologize publicly on behalf of their parents and 
relatives for crimes committed during the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994.17 At the 
end of the conference, well known Hutu poet, actor, filmmaker and now Rwandan MP, 																																																								
14 Eugenia Zorbas, “What Does Reconciliation after Genocide Mean? Public Transcripts and Hidden 
Transcripts in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 1 (2009), 127–47. 
15 Lars Waldorf, “Revisiting Hotel Rwanda : Genocide Ideology, Reconciliation, and Rescuers,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 11, no. 1 (2009), 101–25. Zorbas, “What Does Reconciliation after Genocide Mean?” 
16 Susan Thomson, “Whispering Truth to Power: The Everyday Resistance of Rwandan Peasants to Post-
Genocide Reconciliation,” African Affairs 110, no. 440 (2011), 439–56. Eltringham, Accounting for 
Horror. 
17 Youth Connect is a Rwandan youth platform aimed at promoting unity and reconciliation. 
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Edouard Bamporiki came forward to apologize on behalf of his paternal uncle who had 
participated in the genocide. Encouraging other young Hutu to follow his example, 
Bamporiki called for them to “step out of the shadow of what was done by [their] 
parents.” In his view, “[apology] is an important tool not only for reconciliation, but also 
for sustained nation building.” His conviction is that “apology redeems people. If we 
don’t help the young people do away with this kind of shame, whoever is willing to harm 
government, or Rwandans for that matter, will find it easy to manipulate them.”18 
In the weeks that followed Bamporiki’s apology, several government officials, 
including then serving Prime Minister Pierre-Damien Habumuremyi, also publicly 
apologized on behalf of Hutu génocidaires.19 Four months later, in November 2013, the 
call for public apologies was formalized with the launch of the program known as Ndi 
Umunyarwanda (I am Rwandan). This program includes as a resolution the statement 
that: “the genocide against Tutsis was committed in the name of Hutus, thus for the real 
healing of Rwandan society it is indispensable that Hutus whose name was used in the 
genocide crime apologize to Tutsi victims, denounce such acts and distance themselves 
from perpetrators, and fight clearly against the genocide ideology and ethnical 
divisionism.”20 Paul Kagame’s government promotes Ndi Umunyarwanda as a program 
designed to rebuild trust by encouraging individuals to tell the truth about what happened 
in the genocide. In doing so, it aims to strengthen unity and reconciliation among the 
citizens of Rwanda. While supporters of the program stress that children of Hutu are 
encouraged rather than obliged to apologize on behalf of their parents, Ndi 
Umunyarwanda sits uncomfortably alongside the official policy of unity and 
reconciliation in Rwanda. In its published policy, the Rwandan government defines unity 
and reconciliation as “a consensus practice of citizens who have common nationality, 
who share the same culture and have equal rights; citizens characterized by trust, 
tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementary roles/interdependence truth, and 
healing of one another’s wounds inflicted by history, with the objectives of laying a 
foundation for sustainable development.”21 The identification of Rwandan Hutu and their 
children as a different social group counters the government’s claim that “We are all 
Rwandans.” 
According to the 2014 US Department of State’s Country report on Human Rights 
Practices in Rwanda, a number of observers have voiced concern that the Ndi 
Umunyarwanda program implies that all Rwandan Hutu were collectively responsible for 
the 1994 genocide and so risks exacerbating ethnic tensions in Rwanda.22 Indeed, critics 
of Ndi Umunyarwanda have argued that, rather than promoting national unity and 																																																								
18 Felly Kimenyi, “We Need to Step out of Our Parents' Shadows – Poet Bamporiki,” The New Times 
Rwanda, July 22, 2013, accessed January 10, 2017, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2013-07-
22/67715/. 
19 “Apology: Singling out a Community over the Genocide is not Right - Opinion,” The East African, July 
19, 2013, accessed January 10, 2017, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/Rwanda/Opinion/Singling-out-a-
community-over-the-genocide-is-not-right---/-/1433246/1919944/-/9r2nvvz/-/index.html.	
20 United Nations, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, accessed January 10, 2017, 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2014humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=236394&year=2014#wrapper. 
21 The Rwandan Government: National Unit and Reconciliation Commission, The National Policy on Unity 
and Reconciliation, accessed January 10, 2017, 
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=70&tx_drblob_pi1%5BshowUid%5D=26&tx_drblob_pi1%5Bback
Pid%5D=70&cHash=c20f2fb5aa530ce0c74071b5585dfba2. 
22 United Nations, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014.  
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reconciliation, the program reinforces divisions in Rwandan society by associating all 
Rwandan Hutu with a sense of collective guilt. For example, Jean-Pierre 
Dusingizemungu, President of Ibuka, the umbrella organization for genocide survivors in 
Rwanda, has stated that not all Hutu should be asked to seek forgiveness, because not all 
Hutu committed genocide.23 It is well known that many Hutu also died during the 
genocide, some of them killed for trying to protect friends and neighbors, others because 
they were married to Tutsi, or because they refused to participate in the killings. 
The contradiction between a concept of national identity in which ethnic 
categories no longer exist (“I am Rwandan”) and a program specifically targeted at the 
Hutu is obvious. What it crystallizes is what many see as the stigmatization in post-
genocide Rwanda of those formerly identified as Hutu. As Nigel Eltringham 
demonstrates in Accounting for Horror, there is a tendency to “globalize guilt according 
to ethnic identity.”24 This, he warns, can have dangerous consequences since “the 
constructed image of two heterogeneous collectivities of “the Hutu” and “the Tutsi” 
central to genocidal propaganda can be easily overlaid by “génocidaires” (those who 
committed the genocide) and “rescapés” (survivors of the genocide).25 In other words, 
Hutu becomes synonymous with perpetrator. Indeed, critics of Paul Kagame’s 
government, such as Jennie Burnet, condemn official commemorations of the 1994 
genocide as “[perpetuating] generalizations of Tutsi as the innocent victims and Hutu as 
the bloodstained perpetrators.”26 As an antidote to such generalizations, Burnet calls for a 
“more nuanced account of the genocide, the civil war, and the postgenocide period.”27 
Such an account, she argues, “yields a much more complicated history. Individual violent 
experiences during the civil war, genocide, or insurgency do not fit neatly into the dyadic 
Hutu perpetrator/Tutsi victim logic. Many Hutu died in the genocide because they 
opposed the extremist regime that chose genocide as its policy or because they “looked” 
Tutsi, because they were married to Tutsi or because they hid or protected Tutsi.”28  
For the Rwandan government, however, there is little room for ambiguity in the 
narrative of the genocide. Challenging those critics who offer alternative versions of the 
story, Kagame’s response is unequivocal: “Genocide happened in broad daylight and the 
population knows who is guilty and who is innocent of genocide crimes.”29 As a 
consequence, any deviation from the official narrative can be viewed as an expression of 
genocide ideology.30 Indeed, some researchers have even claimed that the law against 
																																																								
23 “Genocide: Debate Rages on over Call for Apology,” The East African, July 20, 2013, accessed January 
10, 2017, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Genocide-Debate-rages-on-over-call-for-apology-/-
/2558/1920950/-/1213lpy/-/index.html. 
24 Eltringham, Accounting for Horror, 69.	
25 Ibid., p.72. 
26 Jennie E. Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory, and Silence in Rwanda (Madison, Wisconsin: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 12. 
27 Ibid.,110 
28 Ibid., 111. 
29 Paul Kagame, preface to After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, ed. Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman (London: C Hurst & Co 
Publishers Ltd, 2009), xxiii. 
30 Waldorf, “Revisiting Hotel Rwanda.” 
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genocide ideology is used to silence civilians and political opponents who challenge 
government policy.31 
 
Positioning in Relation to Government Policy  
 
In the corpus of interviews discussed in this paper, there is no shortage of explicit 
references to the post-genocide narrative on unity and reconciliation imposed by the 
government. This appears to support Harré and Moghaddan’s claim that the “positioning 
of one person or a category of persons can be brought about deliberately and as a matter 
of policy by someone else, or by some authority.”32 It is clear that the interviewees had 
fully understood the government’s narrative, to the extent that they were able to articulate 
the terms of the unity and reconciliation policy discussed above. What we cannot know, 
of course, is whether or not the individuals agree with the policy. For example, when 
asked at the end of her interview if there was a message she would like to give to other 
Rwandans, the wife of a convicted perpetrator explained: 
 
“Rwandans have always lived together, helping one another, sharing with one 
another, giving cows and brides to another. We should keep on striving for the 
unity of Rwandans and not let them separate. So, what we would tell Rwandans in 
general is to stay united and to avoid anything that might separate us, and to once 
again live with one another and give cows and help one another; and keep coming 
together and sharing.” (Association #8) 
 
Echoing the government’s narrative almost word for word, this woman’s message for 
other Rwandans reiterates the claim that historical unity existed in Rwanda prior to 
foreign colonization. Furthermore, this is not an isolated case. For example, another 
survivor in a different association draws a similar conclusion: 
 
“Before the genocide, just like our parents, we lived together in harmony with our 
neighbors and with our Hutu brothers. We saw our fathers offering cows to each 
other, they planned weddings together and they built houses together” 
(Association #5). 
 
Such conformity is far less surprising however, when interpreted through the lens 
of positioning theory. The very act of deliberate positioning creates a moral duty to 
behave in accordance with a limited and socially approved repertoire of actions.33 Some 
researchers have even argued that the NURC restricts freedom of speech in its citizens 
and is designed to sustain a generation of loyalists among the younger generations.34 
From our corpus it appears that the interviewed survivors recognized and accepted this 																																																								
31 Filip Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in 
Post-Genocide Rwanda,” African Affairs 110, no. 438 (2011), 1–34. 
32  Harré and Moghaddam, “Introduction: The Self and Others in Traditional Psychology and in Positioning 
Theory,” 7.	
33  Harré, “Positioning Theory: Moral Dimensions of Social-Cultural Psychology.” 
34 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.” Chi Mgbako, 
“Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 18 (2005), 201-224. 
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duty. The survivors encouraged other Rwandans to forgive and reconcile “…because 
there is no other way” (Association #9). One survivor conveyed this sense of duty very 
clearly:  
 
“[….] There is nothing the commission of unity hasn’t done either for genocide 
survivors or those who participated in the genocide. So, I think we should not be a 
burden, but be like its children, like a parent and their children. When a parent is 
guiding their children, they must listen. That is why we also should listen to the 
commission of unity when it encourages us to do things in harmony and not be a 
burden to it.” (Association #3) 
 
In this example, we see that some survivors are so keen to comply with the government’s 
message that they claim to be willing to give up their own agency in order to comply with 
what is requested of them, putting themselves in the position of children listening to a 
well-intentioned parent. Other survivors speak about the possible consequences of not 
complying with expectations: for example, one woman describes how she was labelled as 
an “angry person” and had previously been ostracized from her community until she 
joined her association (Association #1). In her interview this woman discusses how she 
had difficulty buying vegetables from Hutu sellers in the market and received no support 
from other survivors, as they believed her to have a “bad attitude”. 
The duty to uphold the policy of reconciliation is also mirrored in perpetrators, all 
of who are eager to demonstrate that they now abide by the societal norms of social 
cohesion and unity. For example, when a convicted perpetrator, now released from 
prison, was asked to compare his life in prison to his present life, he responded by saying: 
 
“Now I feel like I am Rwandan, because when I was in prison I was depressed. I 
felt Rwandan when I joined [gives name of association] that was founded by our 
elders who had thought about the people from [he gives the name of his village] 
who were in prison.” (Association #5) 
 
Thus, it appears that this former perpetrator is showing his support for the NURC’s 
policy by saying that he now views himself as Rwandan (rather than Hutu). The repeated 
reiterations of the government narrative in our analysis point to the way in which the 
Rwandan government has cultivated among its citizens a shared societal obligation for 
people to identify as Rwandan in order to forgive and reconcile with one another. The 
obligation to forgive has been identified by other researchers, most notably Thomson 
who, on the basis of fieldwork carried out during the gacaca community trials in 2006, 
reported that some survivors had admitted to giving false testimony when government 
officials attended the trials as a way of demonstrating their commitment to this policy.35 
Such evidence leads us to the important question of why Rwandans citizens appear to 
endorse the post-genocide narrative so strongly. Some existing research would provide an 
answer to this question by suggesting that the government has created an environment 
where blind conformity is the only possible (or sensible) response. For example, Waldorf 
has argued that any deviation from the government’s narrative is viewed as an expression 																																																								
35 Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power, 2013. 
	 12 
of negationism or genocide ideology;36 others have argued that government policy is used 
to restrict freedom of speech and promote indoctrination.37 Certainly, the approach taken 
to the Ndi Umunyarwanda program reviewed in the previous section would seem to 
support such conclusions. However, our analysis of interviews with members of 
community associations also points to another reason why ordinary citizens choose to 
uphold this policy; a more pragmatic reason.  
Following a Presidential decree in January 2003, in which thousands of convicted 
perpetrators returned home after their release from prison, survivors found themselves in 
the position of having to live alongside people who had killed their loved ones.38 It was 
this situation paired with the motivation to prevent further violence that gave some 
survivors the courage to form associations that worked towards unity and reconciliation 
in their own communities. In fact, survivors started seven of the ten associations in our 
corpus. For these survivors, reconciliation was a long and difficult process that occurred 
slowly over many years as they learned to trust one another again, initially by working 
together on mutually beneficial projects in these associations. This sentiment is clearly 
articulated by the founding member of one of the associations: 
 
“We started to accept our new life. Let me be quick and say that we got to a point 
where we started thinking of doing activities concerning development, because 
we had learned that when people work together doubt goes away fast…. The 
houses were built and we lived in them, but we also had to have things we could 
all do together which would help us to be together most of the time; so that no one 
goes around thinking to themselves: he is a Tutsi.” (Association #2) 
 
This reasoning is consistent with a model of reconciliation proposed by psychologists 
Nadler and Shnabel, in which they propose that a positive change to the identities of both 
groups is facilitated through sustained cooperation on activities that are beneficial to all 
involved.39 Such gradual changes in trust and respect for the other group were also 
mirrored in some of the interviews with perpetrators. For example, one perpetrator talked 
about how the activities of the association had helped him to identify with the survivors 
and re-evaluate what he had previously been told by both his parents and teachers in 
school. He ends his interview by saying: “So I found that, I found that we really fought 
over nothing!” (Association #4). It is our contention that these extracts challenge the view 
that upholding the government’s narrative can simply be reduced to a process of blind 
conformity or indoctrination. Instead, our conclusions are consistent with one attitude 
towards reconciliation identified by Moss and Vollhardt, which they classify as a 
																																																								
36 Waldorf, “Revisiting Hotel Rwanda.” 
37 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World.” Mgbako, “Ingando 
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38 Eugenia Zorbas, “Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” African Journal of Legal Studies 1, no. 1 
(2004), 29–52. 
39 Arie Nadler and Nurit Shnabel, “Instrumental and Socioemotional Paths to Intergroup Reconciliation and 
the Needs-Based Model of Socioemotional Reconciliation,” in The Social Psychology of Intergroup 
Reconciliation, ed. Arie Nadler, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 37–56.	
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utilitarian response.40 Based on data derived from fifty-six interviews with ordinary 
Rwandan citizens, Moss and Vollhardt found that some individuals justified a shared 
Rwandan identity with a pragmatic concern for sustaining peace and rebuilding Rwanda. 
As such, individuals support government polices because they believe they provide them 
with continued political stability and economic development. This attitude is repeatedly 
expressed by the interviewees in our corpus: for example, when the child of a perpetrator 
is asked why she was motivated to persuade her father to confess and ask for forgiveness, 
she says: “I said: what happened will never happen again” (Association #3), which shows 
a concern with maintaining peace and stability. A survivor conveys a utilitarian response 
more explicitly: “What I can add is when a country has peace and food and water to 
drink, then people will not murder each other” (Association #2). 
 
 
Social and Political Implications  
 
Despite the positioning of reconciliation as a civic duty to uphold, many of the 
individuals in our corpus report various social and psychological benefits from their 
participation in the unity and reconciliation associations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
perpetrators and their family members acknowledge how their participation has enabled 
their re-integration into society and reduced perceptions of resentment towards them. For 
example, when asked how the association had helped him personally, a perpetrator 
explained: 
 
“At first I was afraid of them [the survivors in the association], but they were 
welcoming as most of us have known each other since we were children. We 
know each other, we are neighbors. They made me less afraid and we talked and 
talked, and they took us to training sessions. Now when I see a Tutsi, I see 
myself.” (Association #6) 
 
However, the social and emotional benefits are not limited to the perpetrators and their 
relatives; in fact, some survivors claimed that the grief and pain that had been weighing 
on them since the genocide had been eased through their participation in an association. 
Many survivors talked about how associations had given them both a place to share their 
stories with other survivors and a safe environment where their pain could be heard and 
recognized by those who had inflicted it. Over time these environments have allowed 
some perpetrators to come forward and share information with survivors about where 
their family members had been killed or what had happened to their family’s property. 
Thus, the survivors whose agency and power had been taken from them during the 
genocide were re-empowered by this knowledge and by the perpetrators’ 
acknowledgment of the harm caused by their actions.41 One survivor discussed how her 
																																																								
40 Sigrun Marie Moss and Johanna Ray Vollhardt, “You Can't Give a Syringe with Unity”: Rwandan 
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participation in the association had helped to alleviate the physical symptoms she endured 
because of the trauma: 
 
“Unity and reconciliation is good, it frees one’s heart because I told you before 
that I used to have constant headaches, but the days went by and as I kept talking 
to them, those things that burdened my head are not there. Yes, you can’t forget 
what happened to you, but you get relief.” (Association #9) 
 
In these situations, empathy acts as a shared emotional process, in which both a 
survivor and a perpetrator identify with and respond to the pain of the other. The survivor 
feels the remorse felt by the perpetrator, and the perpetrator takes responsibility for the 
harm caused by his or her actions.42 Researchers have reported evidence of the healing 
power of forgiveness and reconciliation in Rwanda. For example, in a sample of one 
hundred survivors, Mukashema and Mullet found that holding an attitude towards 
reconciliation characterized by a renewed motivation to live and work together was 
associated with improved mental health.43 In our corpus we also found some survivors 
reporting that this shared connection had made them feel responsible for the social 
welfare of others in their community. For example, when discussing how the association 
had begun, one survivor explained how the two groups (in this case, survivors and 
women whose husbands had been imprisoned for genocide crimes) had learned to 
acknowledge one another’s suffering: 
 
“After the women came together, we put our problems together. We felt like… 
Both sides listened to each other and you understood that even if the other 
women’s husbands had hurt us, those women have problems today.” (Association 
#8) 
 
Survivors recognized that the wounds of the genocide, although not equivalent, extended 
beyond their own, and they started to feel responsible for ensuring that conditions within 
Rwanda improved so that history would never be repeated. In psychological research, this 
kind of response has been termed inclusive altruism born of suffering, which refers to 
instances when the motivation to help others extends beyond one’s own in-group.44 In our 
analysis, this notion is strongly underpinned by the reasons most Rwandans in our corpus 
gave for supporting the policies of the NURC, as outlined in the previous section. 
Although the individuals in our corpus reported experiencing benefits, it is 
important to consider the potential harm of the positioning imposed by the NURC. Our 
data is not comprehensive in terms of the viewpoints represented; as previously 
mentioned, the interviews were conducted with the purpose of showcasing successful 
stories of unity and reconciliation. It is therefore unsurprising that it does not include the 																																																								
42 Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, “Remorse, Forgiveness, and Rehumanization: Stories from South Africa,” 
Journal of Humanistic Psychology 42, no. 1 (2002), 7–32. 
43 Immaculee Mukashema and Etienne Mullet, “Reconciliation Sentiment Among Victims of Genocide in 
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(2010), 25–39. 
44 Johanna R. Vollhardt and Ervin Staub, “Inclusive Altruism Born of Suffering: The Relationship between 
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Orthopsychiatry 81, no. 3 (2011), 307–15. 
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views of people who actively resist or subtly challenge the narrative and positioning of 
the NURC. By contrast, Thomson’s research has revealed that some Rwandans find 
subtle ways to communicate their dislike of what she refers to as the obligation to 
forgive.45 In her study of the gacaca trials, she reported some survivors covertly 
undermining the Rwandan authorities by laughing out loud during a perpetrator’s 
confession or by glaring at officials to signal their contempt. Such subtle acts of 
resistance demonstrated that, at least for some people, the desire for reconciliation was 
far from genuine and represented a government-imposed reality. Positioning can be 
harmful for people who resist or challenge the post-genocide narrative, as was shown to a 
certain extent in our interviews through the words of the survivor who had experienced 
social isolation before joining associations for unity and reconciliation.  
The harmful effects of rejecting or challenging the cultural storyline have been 
outlined in a recent theory of identity development. McLean and Syed’s theory draws 
upon the narrative approach in psychology, which conceptualizes identity as the process 
of developing a coherent life narrative that connects past, present and future selves across 
time and across contexts.46 McLean and Syed claim that an individual’s life story is 
constructed in relation to the cultural storyline (or master narrative). That is, an 
individual’s personal identity is deeply informed by the beliefs and values embedded in 
the master narrative, given that the master narrative provides a culturally shared story of 
what it means to be a good and valued member of society. Individuals whose personal 
narratives deviate from this master narrative are at risk of not belonging and as such can 
find themselves ostracized or excluded by others. Of note here, some scholars have 
claimed that mass involvement of civilians in the genocide was in part a function of a 
culture that cultivated a strong need to conform and obey authority.47 In which case, the 
positioning of reconciliation as a moral duty becomes particularly problematic for people 
who disagree with the NURC narrative. Further research is needed to identify what 
alternative narratives individuals construct in an attempt to avoid political and social 
exclusion. We did not find any evidence of such narratives, which is likely a result of the 
fact that our interviews were collected by the Genocide Archive of Rwanda. 
Another issue with the positioning created by NURC policies is the implicit 
association between Hutu heritage and the transmission of guilt to younger generations. It 
was evident from one of our interviews that a child of an imprisoned perpetrator felt the 
need to rid herself of suspicion by joining an association and also by encouraging her 
father to confess his crimes and ask for forgiveness from those he had harmed. She tells 
the interviewer that she joined the association because “as a child, everywhere I passed 
people said: “look, the interahamwe just passed by.” (Association #3). This child’s fear is 
further contextualized and understood in the light of Mukashema and Mullet’s recently 
published survey study of Rwandan people’s perceptions of guilt in the children of 
perpetrators.48 Mukashema and Mullet reported that a small minority of their sample did 																																																								
45 Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power, 2013. 
46 Kate C. McLean and Moin Syed, “Personal, Master, and Alternative Narratives: An Integrative 
Framework for Understanding Identity Development in Context,” Human Development 58, no. 6 (2016), 
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attribute guilt to the child of a convicted perpetrator, particularly if it was the child’s 
father who had committed the crimes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the unity and reconciliation associations are clearly producing positive results in 
terms of building a peaceful future for Rwanda, our analysis of ten oral interviews with 
members of unity and reconciliation associations has shown that individuals sometimes 
align themselves with the government’s storyline for pragmatic rather than ideological 
reasons, namely to avoid further violence or genocide and uphold peace for the sake of 
the country’s youth. More concerning are findings that suggest that the Rwandan 
government’s unity and reconciliation program will reinforce the Hutu’s social 
positioning as génocidaires, particularly when we consider the master narrative alongside 
such initiatives as the Ndi Umunyarwanda program. If the current emphasis in Rwanda 
on apology continues to go hand in hand with the narrative of unity and reconciliation, 
then Hutu guilt is likely to be passed on to future generations. Furthermore, ethnographic 
research by Hilker has shown that youth in Kigali continue to look for information on and 
classify other youth as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, a finding that undermines the progress made 
in the NURC storyline.49 Although this evidence does not seem to prevent the younger 
generation from forming inter-‘ethnic’ friendships, it nevertheless does demonstrate that 
‘ethnicity’ is still a prevalent factor in the social construction of identity in Rwandan 
youth. The perceived transmission of Hutu guilt will ultimately undermine any real 
chance the government has at eliminating ethnic labels and creating an equal and 
cohesive society. Even Edouard Bamporiki who is committed to Ndi Umunyarwanda, 
acknowledges the ongoing stigmatization of being Hutu in post-genocide Rwanda. In 
2013, he spoke to Maggie Ziegler about what he sees as the shame of being Hutu. He told 
her, 
 
“Nineteen years is not enough time to forget this Hutu and Tutsi; I know that 
some are not happy to be Hutu because what was done by Hutu during the 
genocide brings shame to their relatives and friends. If you could change your 
identity you would see that more people would want to be like a survivor, a 
Tutsi.”50 
 
If Rwanda is to achieve its UN Sustainable Development Goal of promoting a just, 
peaceful and inclusive society, then it cannot ignore what some see as the stigmatization 
of being identified as Hutu. Social positioning in the national storyline can reinforce this 
stigma. Unity and reconciliation must not be at the expense of social stigmatization, 
which risks reinforcing the so-called ethnic differences the government claims to want to 
eradicate.  
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